Application of Network DEA Model to Vertically Integrated Electric Utilities by TSUTSUI Miki & TONE Kaoru
GRIPS Policy Information Center                               Discussion Paper : 07-03 
 1
Application of Network DEA Model to Vertically Integrated Electric Utilities  
 
Miki Tsutsui, Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, Japan 
Kaoru Tone, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Japan 
 
Abstract 
Liberalization of the electric power industry has been underway in various countries. 
Under this situation, it is necessary for electric power companies to improve their 
management efficiency in order to survive in a competitive market. This study examines 
management efficiency of vertically integrated electric companies, which consist of 
several divisions, such as generation, transmission, distribution and so forth. Previous 
studies mainly focused on efficiency of only a specific division independently. However, 
we should evaluate firm-level management efficiency based on divisional efficiencies, 
because these divisions are closely linked each other. For measuring firm-level 
efficiency, we apply a network DEA model that considers a streamlined relationship 
among divisions under vertical integration. Furthermore we newly proposed a 
constrained network DEA model to obtain more practical efficiency index. 
Keywords: Network DEA, electric utilities, vertical integration 
 
1 Introduction 
Deregulation of the electric power industry commenced in the early 1990s in several 
countries in Europe, e.g. the UK and Norway, and subsequently many countries and 
regions worldwide followed suit. In order to survive in the new competitive market, 
efficient management is essential for incumbent electric power companies that have 
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been regulated for a long period of time by the authorities. At the same time, it is also 
important to adopt appropriate methods for measuring and evaluating management 
efficiency.  
There are several functions (activities) in electric industry in order to produce and 
provide electricity to customers, like generation, transmission, distribution, retail sales 
and so forth. Since the technology used in these activities are different each other, there 
exist function-specific companies, e.g. generation companies and transmission 
companies. On the other hand, a vertical integrated electric power company, which 
consists of all of these activities as divisions within one company, is also typical 
supplier in many countries, such as Japan, the U.S., and Germany. This study focuses 
on these vertically integrated companies. 
The overall efficiency of such companies depends on their divisional efficiencies. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that these divisions are interdependent, and the 
efficiency of a certain division exerts an influence on those of the other divisions. 
Actually, it may happen that the excellent performance of a certain division can be 
achieved at the sacrifice of other divisions’ performance. For instance, even if the 
generation division only performs very well, the other divisions, e.g. transmission and 
distribution divisions might perform worse than those of the other companies. From the 
firm-level viewpoint, such a vertically integrated company cannot be qualified as an 
efficient company. Thus, in order to evaluate companies of this type, we should focus 
on the overall firm-level efficiency resulting from well-balanced divisional efficiencies.  
Since electric power has taken the role of a major source of energy, considerable 
numbers of authors have addressed efficiencies in this industry (see Jamasb and Pollitt 
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[2001]). These previous studies mainly focused on efficiency of only a specific division 
of vertically integrated companies or function-specific companies. On the other hand, 
studies that measured the firm-level management efficiency of vertically integrated 
electric companies were very limited, and most of them focused on a simple input-
output correspondence, e.g. capital, labor and material as inputs, and generated power as 
an output. This implies these studies regarded the inner structure of this industry as a 
“black box.” Thus, for measuring firm-level efficiency, we employ a network DEA 
model to take into account the streamlined structure among divisions under vertical 
integration. Furthermore, in applying network DEA, this study develops the new 
constrained network DEA (CNDEA) model that explicitly restricts the intensity of 
connectivity among activities within a company in order to obtain more practical 
efficiency indices. 
This study is organized as follows. In section 2, we review previous studies on 
management efficiency of electric utilities and the network DEA model, and then 
explain several network DEA models introduced in the previous studies and develop 
them to CNDEA model in the 3rd section. We apply this model to vertically integrated 
electric power companies in the U.S. as a numerical example in section 4, and compared 
the result with the traditional network DEA model. Section 5 concludes this study and 
mentions future extensions. 
2 Literature review 
Studies on management efficiency of electric power companies emerged primarily 
after the 1990s (Jamasb and Pollitt [2001] and Qassim et al. [2005]). These studies 
evaluated utilities in various countries and applied several alternative methods for the 
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efficiency measurement such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA).  
Most of the previous studies have focused on the efficiency of the specific functions, 
particularly the network function (transmission and distribution), e.g. Hjalmarsson and 
Veiderpass [1992], Førsund and Kittelsen [1998], and Hattori [2002]. On the other hand, 
only a few studies dealt with the firm-level efficiency of vertically integrated electric 
power companies.  
Goto and Tsutsui [1998] examined the firm-level efficiency using DEA for major 
vertically integrated power companies in Japan and the U.S. from 1984 to 1993. The 
employed data were four inputs; nameplate generation capacity (MW) as proxy for total 
assets of firms, fuel used (kilo calories), number of employees, and purchased power 
(GWh: Giga Watt hour), and two outputs; sales to residential and sales to non-
residential customers (GWh). This study did not consider efficiency of each division 
and assumed that transmission and distribution assets were roughly proportional to the 
asset of generation division. However, this assumption is not always valid.  
Delmas and Tokat [2005] also examined the efficiency of vertically integrated 
companies in the U.S. and uncovered the relationship between efficiency scores and 
proportion of supplied electricity that was generated by their own power plants. This 
study considered divisional inputs such as generation, transmission, distribution, sales 
and administrative expenses. However, these inputs were treated as independent and the 
streamlined structure of vertical integration was not considered.  
In our study, we employ a network DEA model that incorporates the streamlined 
structure into the traditional DEA model and measures the firm-level efficiency based 
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on the closely linked divisional efficiencies.  
The basic DEA model such as CCR reports an efficiency score based on input and 
output data. Basically, DMUs using small inputs and producing large outputs are judged 
as efficient in the DEA model. However, it is generally presumed that the mechanism 
between input and output is hidden in a “black box”. Färe and Grosskopf (F&G) [1996, 
2000] are the first to introduce a network structure into DEA model to look into the 
technology structure hidden in the black box of the standard DEA model. The network 
DEA model assumes k nodes (activities) inside the black box. At each node, 
intermediate (and/or exogenous) inputs are used in order to produce intermediate 
(and/or final) outputs. These nodes are regarded as subsections in which different 
activities are performed. 
The network DEA model is suitable to evaluate DMUs with complicated and 
hierarchical structures. In the F&G model, activities at nodes are linked by intermediate 
inputs/outputs; however, the intensity of connectivity among activities is not restricted. 
This implies that efficiency of subsections, i.e. divisional efficiency, is independent of 
each other. It can be pointed out that F&G approach is inadequate to take into account 
the closely linked and streamlined structure of vertically integrated utilities. 
Furthermore, this model may turn out to give a good score to DMUs with unbalanced 
efficiency performance, e.g. efficiency of only one division is extremely high and others 
are low as we explain later. For the sake of practical efficiency evaluation, we should 
give a good score only to well-balanced DMUs.  
Another network DEA model proposed by Lewis and Sexton (L&S) [2004] has a 
multi-stage structure as an extension of the two-stage DEA model proposed in Sexton 
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and Lewis [2003]. This study solves a DEA model for each node independently. For an 
output-oriented model, firstly a general DEA model is solved for the upstream node at 
the 1st stage to obtain the optimal solution of outputs. At the next stage, a part of (or all 
of) optimal outputs obtained at the upstream node are applied as intermediate inputs to 
the next node. After solving DEA models for all nodes in turn, a final optimal output is 
obtained at the last node. The firm-level efficiency score is measured as the final 
optimal output divided by an observed output. Similar to F&G, the intensity of 
connectivity among activities is not restricted in this model and divisional efficiencies 
are assumed to be independent of each other.  
In our study, we modify the F&G network DEA model and propose a constrained 
network DEA (CNDEA), which explicitly restricts the intensity of connectivity among 
activities. This constraint has not been considered in previous studies. In our model, 
only DMUs that perform well in all divisions will be evaluated as more efficient, while 
companies with unbalanced divisional efficiency score worse. 
3 A mathematical formulation 
3.1 The traditional network DEA 
A general DEA model such as output oriented CCR is formulated as (1). 
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where X and Y are m×n input and r×n output matrices for n Decision Making Units 
(DMUs), respectively, and xo and yo are the m×1 input and r×1 output vectors of DMUo 
( no ,,1 Λ= ), respectively. −xs  and +ys  are m×1 and r×1 slack vectors for inputs and 
outputs. η is a scalar variable indicating an efficiency score, and λ is a n×1 vector to 
represent the intensity of reference DMUs. In this model, inputs are transformed into 
outputs within a hidden “black box.”  
The network DEA model introduced by F&G assumes k nodes (activities) inside the 
black box. At each node, intermediate (and/or exogenous) inputs are used in order to 
produce intermediate (and/or final) outputs. In this model, the intensity vector λ is 
assumed to be different among k nodes (λk). It means there are k frontiers in this model 
and the efficient DMUs on the frontiers are different from node to node.  
Figure 1 explains a simple example of the network DEA model. In the general DEA 
framework, two exogenous inputs x1 and x2 are used to produce final outputs y2, 
whereas the network DEA model accounts for intermediate outputs/inputs. This 
example supposes two subsections and an output of activity 1 (y1) at node 1 is used as 
an intermediate input for activity 2 at node 2.  
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Figure 1: Simple example of a network DEA model 
A DEA formulation for DMUo to measure output oriented technical efficiency of this 
example is shown in (2). In this model, λs are different between the nodes 1 and 2. 
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where the number of superscript indicates the node number.  
Similar to F&G, the multi-stage network DEA proposed by L&S assumes that the 
intensity vector kλ s are different among k nodes, i.e. the reference group for DMUo is 
different by node.  
3.2 Constrained network DEA model 
In the models with different λs as (2), the efficient DMUs could be very different 
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among nodes. This means that the efficient DMUs at the overall firm level might be 
virtual ones. For instance, suppose that the performance of DMUA is superior to the 
other DMUs in the activity 1 at the expense of activity 2, while DMUB is superior in the 
activity 2 at the expense of the activity 1. They are, so to speak, unbalanced efficient 
DMUs. If we solve the different λs network DEA model with them, DMUo will refer to 
DMUA for the activity 1, and DMUB for the activity 2. It implies that the firm-level 
efficient DMU in this model will be the virtual DMU (DMU*) that consists of DMUA 
and DMUB for activities 1 and 2, respectively. 
 
? ?
? ??
◎ 
Activity 1 Activity 2
×× DMUA 
×× ◎ DMUB 
○ ○ DMUo 
DMUA DMUBReference 
?
A virtual DMU (DMU*), 
which consists of 
Activity 1 of DMUA and 
Activity 2 of DMUB 
 
Figure 2: A virtual DMU referred by DMUo 
If activities are completely independent between activities, it might be possible for 
DMUo to achieve the efficiency level of DMU*. However, in the case that activities are 
interdependent, it must be impossible or unreasonable for DMUo to aim for the 
efficiency level of DMU*, which nibbles here and there and stands at the sacrifice of the 
other activity. Indeed, this model gives DMUo relatively low scores, and sometimes no 
DMU is scored unity. This means there are no efficient DMU and all DMUs refer to 
virtual one. It is doubtful whether this virtual DMU* is a reasonable target for DMUo. 
For instance, in the case DMUo is scored 0.7, our question is whether it is really possible 
for it to improve its efficiency by the remaining 0.3 point in order to achieve the virtual 
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efficiency level.  
This unreasonable situation is attributed to different λs, i.e. different frontiers among 
nodes. If λ is common among nodes, every DMU in every node will refer to the same 
frontier. This case might be more reasonable because DMUo refers to existing DMUs on 
the frontier. It would present a realistic target to improve efficiency. However, this 
situation is nearly the same as the model without intermediate inputs, and hence more 
DMUs will be scored unity than those in the different λs model. Thus, the 
discriminatory power of the common λ model will drop.  
To cope with this inconvenience, we propose a Constrained Network DEA (CNDEA) 
model, which is a midpoint between the different λs and the common λ models. We add 
constraints on λk to avoid DMUo referring to completely different DMUs node by node.  
nodes. ofset  a is ,,,),,1(, KKlklknjklljkj ∈≠=Λ≤− Κλλ  (3) 
In the case Λkl =∞, the model is the same as (2). That is, the intensity vectors are 
independent node by node. This model would be suitable when the activities of 
subsections are mutually independent. On the other hand, the case of Λkl = 0 means that 
all λs are same and the efficient frontier is common to all nodes. The model is the nearly 
same as (1). Thus, we can appropriately choose the value of Λkl depending on the 
connectivity among the subsections.  
Compared with previous studies that assume no connectivity among activities 
(Λkl=∞), our CNDEA model produces a more reasonable and practical efficiency index 
because it reflects connectivity among activities. This model is potentially applicable to 
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a broad range of other industries with network structures, such as telecommunications, 
railways, education and so forth.  
4 Numerical Example 
4.1 The network model structure and dataset 
We used investor owned vertically integrated electric power companies in the U.S. 
from 1990 to 2001 as a numerical example. After eliminating missing values and 
outliers by box plots, we obtained 314 unbalanced panel dataset of 56 companies. In 
this study the vertical structure of electric power companies is defined as described in 
Figure 3 There are four nodes (k = 4) that imply generation, transmission, distribution 
and sales divisions, respectively.  
 
Generation
x1
y1
Transmission
x2
y5
node 1
node 2
Distribution
Sales 
x3
x4
node 3
node 4
y2
y3
y4
 
Figure 3: Structure of our network DEA model 
 
In the generation division (node 1), companies utilize capital, labor and fuel inputs 
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(x1). The capital input is total nameplate capacity of electricity power plants measured in 
Mega Watts (MW), the labor input is number of employees of this division, and fuel 
input is consumed fuel at power plants. Since fuel consumption units differ amongst gas, 
coal, and petroleum, they were converted to British Thermal Units (BTU) in order to 
sum up the fossil fuel data. In contrast, the heat quantity from consumed nuclear fuel is 
difficult to measure. We thus performed backward calculations with the amount of 
nuclear power generation, assuming the thermal efficiency to be 0.32.  
Using these three inputs, the generation division produces electric power (y1), which 
is measured in Mega Watt hours (MWh). Then it becomes an intermediate input for the 
transmission division (node 2). 
In the transmission division, we assumed three exogenous inputs (x2) and one 
intermediate input (y1). The capital input is transmission line length (kilo meter: km) 
and the labor input is the number of employees in this division. Furthermore, we 
employed purchased power from outside measured in MWh as an exogenous input. 
Electric power companies have two alternative power sources for supplying energy to 
customers; their own electric power plants and purchased power from other companies. 
The intermediate input (y1) corresponds to the former source, and the third exogenous 
input corresponds to the latter one.  
Electricity through transmission lines is sent to distribution lines. However 
distribution lines are used by small customers such as residential. This study assumes 
that large customers such as industrial do not use distribution lines and are supplied 
electricity directly from transmission lines, while residential customers are supplied via 
distribution lines. Therefore, outputs of the transmission division are divided into two 
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parts, i.e. electricity sent to small customers (y2) and large customers (y3).  
The distribution division (node 3) uses capital and labor inputs (x3) and the 
intermediate input from the transmission division (y2). The capital input is the total 
capacity of transformers measured in Mega Volt Ampere (MVA), and the labor input is 
the number of employees in this division. The output of this division is also electricity 
to small customers (y4) after eliminating the estimated distribution losses.  
The sales division (node 4) provides electricity supply services to large and small 
customers. In our structure, this division uses a labor input as an exogenous input (x4) 
and two intermediate inputs (y3 and y4), and produces the final output (y5), which is the 
sum of y3 and y4.  
Dataset was constructed from the “FORM No.1” and “FORM No.423” published by 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and “Form EIA-860” published by 
Energy Information Administration (EIA). Table 1 shows input and output for all four 
divisions.  
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Table 1: Dataset of all divisions 
G1 Capital Input Nameplate Capacity (MW)
G2 Labor Input Number of Employess (#)
G3 Fuel Input Fuel Consumption (BTU)
Output
⇒ Intermediate Input
T1 Capital Input Transmission Line Length (km)
T2 Labor Input Number of Employess (#)
T3 Purchased Power Purchased power (MWh)
Output Electric Power Transmittedto large customers(MWh)
Output
⇒ Intermediate Input
D1 Capital Input Transformer Capacity (MVA)
D2 Labor Input Number of Employess (#)
Output
⇒ Intermediate Input
⇒ Intermediate Input Electric Power Transmittedto large customers(MWh)
x4 S1 Labor Input Number of Employess (#)
Final Output Total Electric Power Sales (MWh)
Input and output factors
Electric Power Generated (MWh)
Electric Power Distributed
to small customers(MWh)
G
en
er
at
io
n
D
is
tri
bu
tio
n
Sa
le
s
x1
Electric Power Transmitted
to small customers(MWh)
x2
x3
y3
y5
Tr
an
sm
is
si
on
y1
y3
y2
y4
 
4.2 Results 
Figure 4 compares the results of the network DEA model with various Λs in the 
production possibility set P under CRS.  Λ=∞ and Λ=0 correspond to  the different λs 
and common λ models, respectively. 
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Figure 4: Results of the network DEA with various Λs under CRS 
As this figure shows, the results of Λ=∞ and 1.00 are nearly the same, and there is no 
efficient DMU scoring unity1. This implies all DMUs refer to a virtual DMU. On the 
other hand, 54% of all DMUs score unity in the other extreme case where Λ=0, thus the 
discriminatory power of this model is weaker than the other models. In the models in 
which connectivity restrictions are imposed, the efficiency scores appear between those 
of Λ=0 and 1, and the scores become generally higher as Λ gets closer to 0. 
Figure 5 describes the results under VRS. On this figure, we do not show the result of 
Λ=∞ because it is completely the same as that of Λ=1. 
                                                 
1 The maximum efficiency score is 0.988.  
GRIPS Policy Information Center                               Discussion Paper : 07-03 
 16
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
DMUs in descending order of the score in Λ=1.00
Λ=0
Λ=0.01
Λ=0.10
Λ=1.00
 
Figure 5: Results of the network DEA with various Λ under VRS 
Compared with Figure 4, we can find DMUs scoring unity in the case of Λ=1; 
however, they are only 2% of the sample. The share of DMUs scoring unity in Λ=0 is 
68%, which is larger than that under CRS and implies weak discriminatory power. 
These results demonstrate that we can obtain more reasonable DEA scores if we 
appropriately choose the value of Λ depending on the connectivity among the 
subsections. Unfortunately, we have not discovered a practical way how to define Λ, 
and we leave this as a future project.  
5 Conclusion 
This study newly proposed constrained network DEA (CNDEA) to evaluate 
management efficiency of vertically integrated electric companies, which have the 
streamlined structure with closely linked divisions such as generation, transmission, 
distribution, and so forth. Through this model with an appropriate value of Λ, 
reasonable and practical efficiency scores can be obtained. It has potential use in a 
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broad range of applications, including other industries with network structure.  
In terms of future research, we should investigate and clarify how to find the 
appropriate Λ that is depending on the connectivity among the subsections. And then, 
we will apply this model to the vertically integrated electric power companies to 
evaluate their management efficiency and provide useful and practical information to 
these companies in order to survive in the competitive market, and also to regulatory 
authority to evaluate those companies appropriately.  
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